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Abstract
Purpose – Building on the literature of hybrids in the context of public organizations, this paper aims to
discuss under which conditions hybrids can adequately provide “critical services”, a subset of public services
characterized by their simultaneous exposure to externalities, socio-economic cohesion and legitimacy concerns.
Design/methodology/approach – The authors collect indications from two stylized examples, prisons
and defense, to develop propositions as a step toward assessing the potential role of hybrids as alternatives to
direct public provision or full privatization in the delivery of critical services.
Findings – This paper examines the conditions under which hybrid arrangements outperform the polar
cases of public bureaus and full privatization in the delivery of a speciﬁc subset of public goods that the
authors identify as “critical services”.
Originality/value – The authors suggest that there might be comparative advantages in relying on hybrid
arrangements rather than the usual solutions of fully private or fully governmental provision. However, they
also submit that these advantages are conditional to the capacity of hybrids to reconcile competing interests
to achieve socio-economic cohesion, to combine capabilities dispersed among partners to beneﬁt from positive
externalities and to satisfy legitimacy concerns with respect to the role of government.
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Introduction
The pertinence of hybrid arrangements to deliver public services is a controversial
subject. Some challenge the ability of these arrangements to address citizen needs
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effectively (Chen, Hubbard, & Liao, 2013; Hodge & Greve, 2007). However, despite
numerous problems, the number of agreements such as public-private partnerships
(PPPs) around the globe is ever growing (World Bank, 2017), including in the delivery
of critical services where governments are traditionally the sole provider.
Critical services can be characterized as services that are no direct inputs to other
economic activities and:
 must deal with externalities that directly affect the life of citizens;
 are needed to secure socio-economic cohesion; and
 raise issues of political legitimacy.
Services meeting these criteria deserve special attention because they pose problems of
coordination among suppliers; generate speciﬁc contractual hazards; raise issues regarding
the modalities of control; and pose questions about the ability of providers to measure,
charge, and collect adequate fees from the beneﬁciaries and about the capacity of end-users
to pay these services according to their usage. If not properly solved, these problems may
generate discontinuities threatening fundamental socio-economic functions. Military
operations, cybersecurity, correctional activities, defense systems are some examples of
critical services that demand further investigation.
In this paper, we aim to identify and analyze conditions under which hybrids can enable
critical services provision and outperform not only government direct-provision but also
full-ﬂedged privatization. Based on the hybrid governance literature on, and using
indications provided by two stylized examples, prisons and defense, we build three testable
propositions addressing under which conditions hybrids can effectively deliver adequate
critical services. We focus on prisons and defense because we ﬁnd these sectors particularly
relevant to understand how hybrids can manage complexity to achieve socio-economic
cohesion, how they can combine capabilities to address externalities, and how they can
satisfy concerns of legitimacy regarding their capacity to deliver appropriate critical
services. At the same time, these examples help delineating the limits these conditions
impose on hybrid solutions and identifying factors that potentially discard them as credible
alternatives.
Our paper, which is conceptual, contributes to the literature by offering a view beyond
the “pure public” versus “pure private” dichotomy and by improving the existing
knowledge on hybrid governance, particularly PPPs. More speciﬁcally, we address the
boundary conditions in which hybrids are feasible alternatives in the highly sensitive
context of critical services. Our arguments are organized as follows. First, we discuss the
concept of “critical services” and its three deﬁning conditions. Second, we take advantage of
the growing literature on hybrids to identify speciﬁc conditions under which the delivery of
critical services through such arrangements can be a feasible and even superior solution.
The next three sections introduce examples that lead to propositions opening ways to
rigorously assess the potential advantages of hybrids in delivering critical services. We are
fully aware that these examples remain what they are: illustrative. Nevertheless, they shed
light on issues encapsulated into our analysis and propositions. Drawing lessons from these
examples, the last section discusses limitations that hybrid solutions face and concludes.
Critical services: deﬁnition and characteristics
The concept of critical services only partially overlaps with the traditional concept of public
goods. The presence of non-rivalry in consumption and non-excludability characterizes
public goods. These properties explain why actors rarely produce these goods at a market
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equilibrium price, or in many cases, at any price at all. Normally, the resulting market
failures require government intervention, with taxes funding this public interference (Pigou,
1932; Weimer & Vining, 2005).
Coase (1960, 1974) challenged this “interventionism,” arguing that voluntary settlements
among private parties may often solve externality problems at lower transaction costs than
those associated to government intervention. Following Coase’s challenge, two other Nobel
Prizes awardees discussed the organizational mechanisms most appropriate to provide
speciﬁc services such as prisons and defense (Hart et al., 1997; Williamson, 1999). Recent
contributions went further, highlighting the possibility that neither private nor public
management can guarantee the optimal provision of some “public” services (Iossa &
Martimort, 2012; Warsen et al., 2018).
Although it has not yet permeated the academic literature, the idea of “critical services”
as referring to a speciﬁc category of public goods has already contributed to some
signiﬁcant reorientation in public policies. The adoption of European Directive 2008/114
(EU, 2008) and the USA Presidential Directive 21 (USA_White_House, 2013) are illustrative
of an increasing concern for services that can carry systemic risks, potentially challenging
the continuity of strategic economic functions and threatening social cohesion. In this paper,
we consider as “critical” those services:
 crucial to maintain social cohesion thus guaranteeing the continuity of socio-
economic interactions;
 providing means to monitor externalities that can impact the capacity of agents to
safely organize their activities; and
 tightly interwoven with legitimacy issues rooted in collective values regarding the
expected role of public authorities.
Services such as defense, police, prisons and related judicial support; or other services –
Williamson (1999) gives the example of diplomacy – needed to secure these three functions
are critical in that respect: they have direct implications on a society’s capacity to organize
economic activities, maintain cohesion among its constituencies, and secure its territory.
Flaws in the provision of these services might challenge the stability or integrity of a society
(Brown& Jacobs, 2009). We discuss each dimension in turn.
Three deﬁning functions: social cohesion, externalities and legitimacy
Critical services differ from public goods in that they can allow excludability and may
exhibit rivalry in consumption. Moreover, in their conventional acceptance public goods are
not primarily intended to deal with externalities while simultaneously securing socio-
economic cohesion and economic stability; and they do not necessarily face legitimacy
challenges if provision is secured by non-governmental actors. Therefore, public goods do
not satisfy our three criteria all together. Critical services also differs from the more recent
concept of critical infrastructures in that these services do not provide direct inputs for other
economic activities, contrarily to electricity, transportation, or sanitation, for example
(Kunneke et al., 2010).
The deﬁning functions of critical services also impose speciﬁc constrains. First,
maintaining socio-economic cohesion is essential to guarantee the integrity of a society, to
reduce disparities, to support productive investments, and to help nations circumventing
economic challenges (Smith, 1976). Dealing with market failures through adequate provision
of critical services is crucial to assure social peace (Polanyi, 1957). In market economies,
governments usually complement market forces in maintaining social order (Brown &
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Jacobs, 2009) through the provision of speciﬁc critical services. For example, governments
secure relationships among citizens by the development of defense systems to prevent
foreign intrusion that would challenge the continuity of social interactions.
Second, the adequate provision of critical services can also generate positive
externalities. It can impact the welfare of a wide range of individuals through services that
can hardly rely on exclusive market provision (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). Examples are the
need to protect property rights, to guarantee safe trading activities, and/or to secure
interactions among organizations. Border security; systems to prevent money-laundering,
tax evasion and corruption; and defense systems and prisons (Bures, 2017) are illustrative of
critical services, whose proper provision can hinder negative externalities that would
otherwise impose costs on third parties (Pigou, 1932).
A third set of constraints, of particular signiﬁcance for our analysis, comes out of the
legitimacy issue. Legitimacy concerns the social acceptance of the modalities through which
critical services can be delivered: it refers to the alignment (or misalignment) between the
organizational arrangement chosen and the citizens’ expectations framed by values and
beliefs regarding the role of public authorities (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Legitimacy plays a
particularly important role in critical services, such as defense systems, in which providers
are at high risk of being exposed to public disapproval (Vergne, 2012). In speciﬁc
institutional settings, a given arrangement (e.g. full privatization) might be perfectly legal
and effective, but generate instability due to challenges by strategic constituencies, while in
other settings in which performance criteria prevail a similar arrangement might be
unconditionally accepted (Hirsch &Andrews, 1984).
Hybrids and the delivery of critical services
If we accept the idea that critical services have speciﬁc characteristics, what is the most
adequate and acceptable organizational solution for their provision? We argue that under
speciﬁc circumstances, “hybrid” arrangements combining resources from otherwise legally
and economically distinct entities can be feasible alternatives. Joint ventures or PPPs are
typical examples. These arrangements differ from markets and hierarchies with respect to
four dimensions: incentive intensity, administrative controls, performance attributes and
contract law (Williamson, 1999). According to Makadok and Coff (2009) hybrids are market-
like in some of these dimensions while simultaneously hierarchy-like in others, a
combination that requires the development of speciﬁc mechanisms of governance (Menard,
2013; Reuer & Devarakonda, 2016).
Why would governments go hybrid to deliver critical services?
The literature initially focused on hybrids in the context of private agreements. In choosing
to go hybrid, parties to a transaction would decide to share essential rights because they
expect to:
 better deal with uncertainty by pooling resources;
 beneﬁt from spillover effects; and
 ease the monitoring of non-contractibility and the allocation of joint rents through
relational contracts (Makadok & Coff, 2009; Menard, 2013; Parmigiani & Rivera-
Santos, 2011).
Concisely, “hybrids” develop because parties expect beneﬁts from jointly calibrating rights,
control, and incentive schemes, thus facilitating adaptability and improving performance
through lower transaction costs.
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These properties have increasingly attracted the attention of contributors intrigued by
the potential role of such arrangements in the provision of public goods and services (Bel,
Brown, & Warner, 2014; Bovaird, 2004; Joldersma & Winter, 2002). These arrangements
take many different forms and names (e.g. coproduction, PPPs, consortia) but share the
central feature of hybrids: substantial decision and property rights are pooled among parties,
in our case between public authorities and private actors.
However, considering the challenging functions that critical services must satisfy, why
and how would such arrangements be relevant for their delivery? Without referring to the
concept of critical services, numerous authors have raised this question for the provision of
services such as defense and prisons. The inherent complexity involved in the provision of
such services along with criticisms regarding the presence of proﬁt-oriented ﬁrms in doing
so create additional challenges to the perspective of adopting hybrid solutions (Forrer, Kee,
Newcomer, & Boyer, 2010; Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke, 2010; Cabral & Santos, 2018). The
sustainability of these arrangements is particularly worrisome when criticality is high
(Grimsey & Lewis, 2004). On the other hand, it has also been argued that implementing
public-private ventures can yield value creation (Mahoney, McGahan, & Pitelis, 2009). This
is likely to occur because idiosyncratic capabilities developed through collaborative
interactions (Sanderson, 2009; Cabral et al., 2013), injection of market incentives (Hefetz,
Warner, & Vigoda-Gadot, 2014), and effective monitoring of private contractors (Cabral
et al., 2010; Pierce & Toffel, 2013). Combining these advantages could allow hybrids to
improve performance, reduce contractual hazards, and increase perception of probity, thus
helping these forms to address simultaneously social cohesion, externalities, and legitimacy
more effectively than polar forms (full privatization vs. full governmental provision).
The alignment issue
We argue that three conditions must be fulﬁlled to have hybrid solutions aligned with the
deﬁning criteria of critical services (socio-economic cohesion, externalities and legitimacy),
thus making it possible for hybrid arrangements to outperform full-ﬂedged privatization
and government provision. Figure 1 summarizes this alignment issue, at the core of our
analytical approach, between the characteristics of the critical services and the
organizational conditions that must be satisﬁed.
More speciﬁcally, we submit three theoretical propositions that intend to capture this
alignment issue. In this conceptual paper, we do not test the validity of these propositions.
Figure 1.
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We rather follow the pattern of some economics, management and public administration
leading scholars (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Hart et al., 1997; Rangan, Samii, & VanWassenhove,
2006), building our propositions and illustrating the applicability of our framework with
real-world examples from two critical services: prisons and defense. The selection of these
two domains is motivated by:
(1) their tight correspondence with our criteria (their role in maintaining socio-
economic cohesion; their capacity to mitigate negative and foster positive economic
externalities; their status in legitimizing governmental action); and
(2) the multiplication of controversial initiatives to introduce hybrid arrangements in
the delivery of these services.
We offer examples from Australia, Brazil, European Union, France, Germany, South Africa,
the UK and the USA. We are aware that these are only examples; they are not
demonstrations nor do they provide a comparative analysis based on an extensive
qualitative or quantitative investigation. This is beyond our scope at this point.
Condition #1: managing complexity to achieve cohesion
Our characterization of critical services emphasizes their importance in assuring economic
continuity while keeping social cohesion. Indeed, the joint presence of a high level of
criticality with non-contractible aspects, for example due to uncertainties coming out of
technological requirements or performance measurement, makes the delivery of these
services particularly exposed to contractual hazards and risks of opportunistic behavior. We
argue that there are circumstances under which hybrid arrangements present advantages
when it comes to reconciling competing interests and dealing with technological and
ﬁnancial complexities, thus positing them in a favorable position to secure socio-economic
cohesion.
Assuring cohesion through adequate provision of prisons and defense services
To build the argument, we ﬁrst consider some experiences of provision of prison and
defense services through hybrid arrangements, and we point out conditions under which
they might have outperformed alternative solutions.
Prison services face important ﬁnancial constraints, accentuated by diverging interests.
The provision of this critical service requires signiﬁcant investment in non-redeployable
infrastructures and in human capabilities to guarantee a secure environment for inmates,
staff, and citizens. Prisons involve several stakeholders, which makes their regulatory
design and performance measurement particularly complex (Boin, James, & Lodge, 2006).
This complexity is ampliﬁed by permanent conﬂicts between rules imposed by public
authorities and those implemented by the inmates themselves. Although communities tend
to pay little attention to conditions of incarceration, social concern about safe conﬁnement is
universal, with prisons primarily expected to guarantee order and security rather than to
provide services for inmates (Wacquant, 2009). This concern for securing social cohesion
and controlling negative externalities clearly underlies the choice by Hart, Shleifer and
Vishny (1997) of prison services to illustrate their discussion on the “proper scope of
government”.
Empirical evidence suggests that there are circumstances under which hybrids may have
comparative advantages in facing these complex factors while circumventing ﬂaws associated
to full privatization and full governmental provision. Total privatization in corrections remains
very controversial. Performance in prisons is far from perfectly contractible and observable,
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which opens room for opportunism, with incentives for private operators to cut costs at the
expense of quality of conﬁnement (Hart et al., 1997). Drawing on the 2000 Census of State and
Federal Adult Correctional Facilities, Makarios and Maahs (2012) showed quality shading in
full-ﬂedged privatization in the USA, with private prisons doing worse than public ones in
treatment and education to inmates. In the same context, Gaes et al. (2004) argue that security is
lower in private prisons. Examples of negative effects of prisons privatization where the
government has limited controls of the correctional activities have also been observed in South
Africa (Rynne&Harding, 2016; Sloth-Nielsen, 2003).
By contrast, Harding (2001) and Lundahl et al. (2009) argued that overall private contractors
did not worsen the conditions and even contributed to improvements in prisons when they
pooled rights and tasks with governments. Empirical results from Australia even suggest
greater attention to the conditions of conﬁnement in privately operated prisons (English, 2013),
with enhanced services compatible with decreased costs when there is intense interactions
between public authorities and private partners (OCIS, 2011). Cabral, Lazzarini & Azevedo
(2010) showed similar advantages in Brazil, with prisons under hybrid governance reporting
escapes 96 per cent lower than in publicly operated prisons, fewer deaths and similar or
enhanced performance in medical care and legal aid for inmates. Quality improvements in
prisons are also observed in the French experience of private participation, particularly with
respect to management, food, cleaning, and health care facilities (Cour_des_Comptes, 2006).
However, these solutions differ for pure privatization. Indeed, a noticeable condition for their
success is the constant interactions between public and private actors, which allowed prison
managers to deal with the inherent complexity of the corrections reality and to promote
enhanced accountability standards (Cabral & Santos, 2018).
As for defense services, their signiﬁcance in maintaining social cohesion by securing a
territory and rights of its inhabitants make them unambiguously critical. Moreover, many
governments have an incentive to develop domestic capabilities in hope of positive economic
externalities coming out of local production of military and defense equipment (Levine,
Mouzakis, & Smith, 2000). However, the technological complexity of these systems often
exceeds what governments can do efﬁciently (Oudot, 2010). Also, full governmental
provision may not be possible or desirable because of red-tape, which thwarts the ﬂexibility
needed to develop new and uncertain technologies (Depeyre & Dumez, 2008). On the other
hand, full privatization put too high a risk on societal needs for protection, while the high
level of sunk costs may deter private operators to fully assume the risks involved in arms-
length contracts (Leyden & Link, 1993).
These elements may explain why government and suppliers tend to share rights in
defense systems. Requirements for innovative technologies and capabilities and geopolitical
aspects motivate the choice of organizational arrangements with joint decision rights,
against an arms-length contractual approach that often leads to cost increases, as observed
in US defense cases (Depeyre & Dumez, 2008). Referring to the US Coast Guard’s Deepwater
project, Brown et al. (2010) argue that a non-cooperative approach may explain inferior
results in complex projects in the defense sector, while evidence from the British defense
sector shows that joint decision-making generates positive results (Sanderson, 2009).
Similarly, Lohmann and Rötzel (2014) demonstrate that hybrid arrangements in the German
defense ease the management of complex technologies and better address government needs
than arms-length contracts. European Union policy makers emphasize the role played by
public-private collaboration in complex domains such as the maritime security, thanks to
improved risk management and more effective crisis response (European_Commission,
2014). Similarly, it has been shown that public-private arrangements help to increase
national system¨s resilience in sensitive domains such as cybersecurity (Bures, 2017). It has
Critical
services
343
also been acknowledged by different public authorities (European_Commission, 2007) that
hybrids help developing interoperability of defense systems, which is crucial to secure socio-
economic cohesion.
Reconciling competing interests in complex settings
What these examples suggest is that there is the potential for hybrids to efﬁciently manage
complexity in contexts in which critical services are crucial to secure socio-economic
cohesion. However, the relevance of choosing hybrid solutions is conditional to a better
identiﬁcation of factors generating this complexity.
There are indeed different sources of complexity, which can arise from supply and/or
demand forces. On the supply side, complexity in the production and delivery of critical
services may come out of technologies requiring expertise that the government may not
have, or of ﬁnancial constraints, either because the government does not have the resources
needed, or because private operators need external support (e.g. reﬁnancing). On the demand
side, complexity can develop when users of critical services have ambiguous or diverging
preferences, thus increasing demand diversity (Fountain, 2001). This diversity often grows
out of the multiplicity of stakeholders with different perceptions of what to expect from
critical services, forcing governments to ﬁnd ways to conciliate competing interests (Klein,
Mahoney, McGahan, & Pitelis, 2013)[1].
How can hybrids outperform polar forms (markets and hierarchies) in dealing with these
complex situations? One argument is that in comparison to, say, standard public
procurement, they facilitate coordination between governments and private operators
(Makadok & Coff, 2009), which can attenuate contractual hazards (Domberger, Farago, &
Fernandez, 1997) and promote the ﬂexibility needed to address diffuse interests and avoid
adverse effects (Klein et al., 2013). Indeed, critical services often involve several synergistic
and competing tasks, for example, operation and maintenance in defense systems. Acting as
“principal,” a government can facilitate coordination among suppliers involved by
combining incentives and authority, thus crafting more efﬁcient governance (Makadok &
Coff, 2009). Formal partnerships with private suppliers can also allow a government to
beneﬁt from their expertise, improving its own capacity to address complex technological
situations and reconcile divergent interests (Gordon & Poppo, 1991; Oudot, 2010).
When it comes to ﬁnancial constraints, hybrids might facilitate access to innovative
ﬁnancial mechanisms, such as new equity funds jointly crafted by public and private
partners (Erol & Ozuturk, 2011) or revenue guarantees based on put options (Cabral & Silva,
2013). Hybrids can also help handling the lack of ﬁnancial resource for government, while
private partners beneﬁt from public authorities remaining ultimately liable, as well
illustrated by numerous PPPs agreements (Hodge & Greve, 2007). Pooling resources might
also mitigate risk of capture and of opportunistic behavior by providing incentives that
attenuate both quality issues observed in full privatization and motivation problems that
plague government provision (Cabral et al., 2010; Hart, 2003). Actually, to get adequate
rewards for their participation, private partners have incentives to meet the variety of
demand; and governmental authorities, at least those in democratic regimes,[2] have
incentives to control quality to satisfy their constituencies and maintain social cohesion,
particularly when critical services face adverse circumstances (Friedkin, 2004). We
summarize these arguments as follows:
P1. The higher the need to face competing interests and constraints in the provision of
critical services, the higher is the opportunity for hybrids to prevail over markets
and hierarchies for managing complexity and securing socio-economic cohesion.
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Condition #2: dealing with externalities
Dealing with externalities is a criterion on which the concept of critical services overlaps
with the concept of public goods. However, it differs because of its interdependence with the
two other criteria, particularly social cohesion. Indeed negative externalities coming out of
inadequate critical services challenge the security of persons and property rights, for
example if prisons do not play their role of conﬁnement or if defense systems do not assure
required protection against external aggressions. We shall argue that there are
circumstances in which hybrid provision of critical services can mitigate negative
externalities and generate positive externalities. This is likely to occur when coordination
capabilities of governments are aligned with distinctive efﬁciency-driven abilities from non-
governmental actors.
Capitalizing capabilities in the delivery of prison and defense services
Combining public and private capabilities in prison services can lower the costs of
containing dangerous individuals under control while promoting social reinsertion (Reasons
& Kaplan, 1975). In a study on Brazilian prisons, Cabral, Lazzarini and Azevedo (2013) show
that hybrids improve related performance indicators; however, these gains are conditional to
previous experience of private entrepreneurs with: dealing with governments and
monitoring security issues. The authors argue that the combination of coordination by
public authorities with incentives and ﬂexibility of private operators put hybrid
arrangements in a favorable position to address simultaneously supporters of law and order
and advocates of more humane treatment. Data from the Australian prison service conﬁrms
such cross-fertilization and positive results when public and private capabilities combine
(English, 2013; OCIS, 2011). More speciﬁcally, empirical evidence suggests that these
beneﬁts prevail over results from the exclusive delivery of prison services by a hierarchical
public entity and by a fully privatized prison if control rights are actually shared, an
important condition to motivate pooling capabilities (Cabral & Saussier, 2013).
Similarly, important positive externalities might come out of the hybrid delivery of
defense services, thanks to pooled capabilities. Besides its role in securing a community, in
many countries defense is a structuring component of economic activities, involving
complex supply chains and generating signiﬁcant export revenues (Yakovlev, 2007).
However, the increasing complexity of defense systems makes it unlikely that all strategic
capabilities can be concentrated in the government. Building partnership with private
operators might do better in capitalizing on disperse knowledge. Although government
agencies tend to keep fundamental research within their domain (Mazzucato, 2013),
activities related to the development of critical technologies increasingly rely on
arrangements that facilitate cross-fertilization.
Casual evidence collected from the development of the Brazilian air-to-air missile MAA-
1A Piranha illustrates this cross-fertilization. In this case, a hybrid arrangement allowed six
government engineers to absorb knowledge about the technical features of the system under
development, while contractor employees got the opportunity to learn about the way
technical requirements are developed by defense ofﬁcers and about the inherent
bureaucracy when transacting with government. One additional beneﬁt of hybrids comes
from the incremental nature of innovation in defense systems. In facilitating information
exchange and knowledge accumulation among a larger number of individuals, the hybrid
arrangement was crucial for the accumulation of joint experience that led to the updated
MAA-1B version of this missile through PPP. The development of the strategic missile M-51
by Airbus Defense and Space provides a very similar example (Moura &Oudot, 2017).
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Public-private interactions combining disperse capabilities has also been observed in
French defense contracts, with indications that it diminishes negative externalities through
reduced information asymmetries and cost overruns (Kapstein & Oudot, 2009). In Germany,
evidence shows that opportunistic behavior from outside suppliers in the defense industry
decreases when the rate of renegotiations increases because private partners have an
interest in building a positive reputation of cooperative behavior (Lohmann&Rötzel, 2014).
Hybrids as learning arrangements
The above examples suggest that public authorities go hybrid because they expect cross-
fertilization from cooperation with private partners when capabilities are disperse among
parties, a positive externality acknowledged by public administration and strategic
management scholars (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011; Cabral et al., 2013). Besides
beneﬁting from the technical expertise of private partners, public authorities may capitalize
on their managerial skills, and/or their knowledge of the demand for critical services (Baum
& McGahan, 2013). Symmetrically, private partners can expect beneﬁts by taking
advantage of shared information and knowledge to posit themselves on future transactions,
with this speciﬁc government or with other (public or private) partners. More generally, it
has been shown that strategic alliances between public and private actors in costly and
complex projects in critical services, such as aerospace and defense, have allowed
contracting parties to mutually beneﬁt from speciﬁc capabilities (Harrigan, 2017).
However, to reap these beneﬁts public authorities must maintain technological and
organizational skills internally to supervise the supplier(s) efﬁciently while securing the
transfer of information and knowledge (Pierce & Toffel, 2013). Indeed, building capabilities
involves learning and experimentation (Zollo & Winter, 2002). For example, the creation of
centers of excellence focused on PPP (e.g. “Partnership UK”) has induced the extensive
diffusion of best practices in these hybrid agreements (Iossa & Martimort, 2012). Enduring
cooperation also develops reputational assets that enable synergies, prevent opportunism,
andmitigate contractual hazards (Sanderson, 2009).
As shown in several empirical studies, by joining complementary capabilities previously
dispersed and disconnected, hybrids boost more ﬂexible solutions, creating conditions to
outperform full outsourcing to private operators or full integration within a public bureau
(Cabral et al., 2013; Rangan et al., 2006). Constant interactions in the decision-making for
multiple, combined activities favor hybrid performance (Gulbrandsen, Thune, Borlaug, &
Hanson, 2015) with possible spillover to other activities as well (Kivleniece & Quelin, 2012).
Hence, when dealing with externalities that require the coordination of dispersed
capabilities, hybrids will likely outperform polar forms. Formally:
P2. The more disperse are the capabilities required for addressing externalities in
critical services provision, the higher are the chances for hybrids to outperform
markets and hierarchies.
Condition # 3: satisfying legitimacy
Political legitimacy is a key value when it comes to the delivery of critical services. Indeed,
government is expected to guarantee a secure provision of these services; but in doing so it
faces important risks with respect to the cost, quality, and timing of delivery (Hart et al.,
1997). Further, all citizens can beneﬁt from critical services at some point, which may feed
high expectations but also claims for public accountability especially when private actors
are involved in the delivery of such sensitive services (Bures, 2017). In this context, the
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acceptance of hybrid solutions and their capacity to outperform polar forms greatly depend
on the way arrangements manage risk and deal with transparency standards.
Dealing with legitimacy in the delivery of prisons and defense services
The intervention of private operators in prisons and defense has raised strong debates about
its legitimacy, as illustrated by the scandal surrounding the private management of prisons
under military supervision in Iraq (Hansen, 2015). Full privatization of prisons, with control
rights transferred to private operators, has been questioned on theoretical ground with the
argument that cost cutting could threaten quality (Hart et al., 1997), a point that empirical
studies in the USA tend to support (Dilulio, 1988; Makarios &Maahs, 2012).
One way for governments to circumvent information asymmetries is through intense on-
site oversight of the private partner (Lazerges, 1997). Although performance and efﬁciency
are important features, accountability is sensitive to public opinion and political actors. This
makes pressure for improved transparency particularly acute when private actors are
engaged in the delivery of prison services (Cabral & Santos, 2018). In France, public
supervisors keep residual control rights over decisions that affect quality while civil
servants jointly act with the private operator (s) in the prison routines (Cour_des_Comptes,
2010). However, the impact of these controls on legitimacy largely depends on public
standards such as rectitude, respect of contractual obligations (Williamson, 1999) and on the
capacity and willingness to monitor private contractors (Cabral et al., 2013). This also
requires adequate incentives for public supervisors, usually based on reputational aspects,
career concerns and long-term labor contracts if no faults are detected, (Cabral et al., 2010).
Symmetrically, empirical evidence shows that the acceptability and performance of hybrids
in prisons also depend on private entrepreneurs having proper control over the inputs
necessary to achieve the assigned goals. French and Brazilian experiences demonstrate that
the capacity of private operators to invest in highly speciﬁc assets required to secure
buildings, to develop and implement security devices, and to train employees are key
features for successful partnerships and to address legitimacy concerns (Cabral & Saussier,
2013).
In the defense industry, the capacity of hybrids to assure efﬁcient coordination while
reducing costs plays a crucial role in forging legitimacy. In an empirical study of the high
technology segment of the French defense system, Ménard and Oudot (2010) showed that
PPPs in the development of innovative projects with high uncertainty, high speciﬁc
investment and highly unpredictable variations in costs relied on ﬂexible risk-sharing rules
to ease coordination. However, to satisfy legitimacy concerns, this relational dimension must
satisfy two conditions: trust and transparency.
In this sensitive and increasingly complex industry, trust depends on the continuous
interactions among partners, which partially explains why defense contractors often hire
former members of the military. Besides absorbing skilled human resources, this strategy
likely carries beneﬁts from close ties with active-duty ofﬁcers, better collaboration and
reduced risks (Brook, Dilanian, & Locker, 2009). Repeated interactions are expected to
engender better control over risks while avoiding adversarial relationship (Sanderson, 2009).
It is particularly so when adjustments and renegotiations respond to the materialization of
risks, as suggested by evidence from German defense contracts (Lohmann&Rötzel, 2014).
However, this relational dimension may also threat the legitimacy of hybrids as it raises
issues of collusive behavior (Markusen, 2003) and secrecy (Parker & Hartley, 2003), thus
reinforcing the need for transparency. The existence of watchdog agencies and audit
commissions may mitigate these effects, for example the Defense Contract Audit Agency or
the Defense Contract Management Agency in the USA or the Cour des Comptes in France.
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Technical features may also obstruct collusion and reduce the risk of opportunism: turning a
blind eye to technical ﬂaws may end up in detectable failures, so that private partners have
an incentive to provide reliable critical services to maintain long term and effective
relationships (Ng, Maull & Yip, 2009). Furthermore, as the defense industry is exposed to
controversy because of the destructive potential of its products, technical credibility and
expertise also foster legitimacy in this industry (Baum&McGahan, 2013).
Risk management, transparency and legitimacy
More generally, a major threat to hybrid solutions comes from incentives for governments to
transfer risks management to private operators, especially when these risks are high and
difﬁcult to monitor. On the other hand, full privatization of critical services easily feed the
view that public authorities are abandoning their duties without evidence of the
effectiveness of this solution (Hodge, 2006). Risk transfer may also engender disruptions,
due either to technological factors, as when technology is new or not well understood by the
private operator or suffer from ﬂaws unforeseen by partners (Kunneke et al., 2010); or to
institutional factors, coming from malignant political forces (e.g. “third party opportunism”),
incompetent regulators, or biased judiciary (Spiller, 2009). These factors expose full
privatization to high contractual hazards and public controversies. In that respect, hybrids
can mitigate or even overcome these risks, particularly when public authorities do not have
the managerial capabilities required to properly monitor risks across all phases of the value
chain (Mahoney et al., 2009). Contracts framing adequately public-private interactions,
particularly if complemented by guiding documents and control devices (Van Den Hurk &
Verhoest, 2016), help leading to a non-adversarial approach and positive outcomes
(Sanderson, 2009), mitigating resistance to private involvement in critical services and
reinforcing the legitimacy of hybrid arrangements.
However, beneﬁtting from these solutions also depends on the capabilities of private
actors to control the resources necessary to reach expected targets (Menard, 2013) and of
public partners to make payments conditional to effective advances in a project (Shen,
Platten, & Deng, 2006). Beneﬁts for private partners are also contingent to guarantees
against the hazards of expropriation once investments have been made (Ng & Loosemore,
2007). These are necessary to reduce risk aversion (Makadok & Coff, 2009) and stimulate
collaborative behavior (Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke, 2010).
When facing a social context of skepticism regarding the beneﬁts of private participation
in critical services, more conditions must even be fulﬁlled to make hybrid solutions accepted
as legitimate. Transparency and accountability standards are compelling factors for all
parties to hybrid solutions in that respect (Forrer et al., 2010). Information on amounts spent,
contractual obligations, performance indicators, and mechanisms to assess conformity must
be disclosed (Hodge & Coghill, 2007). Governmental capabilities to adequately monitor the
contract must be available, which requires technical expertise and non-propensity to engage
in illicit arrangements (Cabral et al., 2013). Legitimacy through transparency can also be
reinforced by independent governmental agencies, NGOs, and other external “watchdogs”
(Bovaird, 2004) that tend to be much more thorough when critical services are delivered by
hybrids than through traditional public provision (Cabral & Santos, 2018; English, 2013).
Indeed, the fear of illicit behavior can push toward reinforcing control over partners, which
may generate some rigidity but also provides incentives for superior performance as parties
are aware that if the legitimacy of going hybrid is challenged, calls to switch back to public
provision will develop. Superior levels of public scrutiny can also avoid misuse of critical
services by economic and political elites to oppress the wider society. Overall, the presence
of effective risk allocation and clear sharing rules can reduce the risk of adversarial
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collaboration (Sanderson, 2009) and facilitate acceptance of hybrid solutions. We summarize
these elements as follows:
P3. The more transparent are risk sharing rules and monitoring devices, including
watchdog agencies, the better are the chances of hybrids to outperform polar
arrangements while being accepted as legitimate solutions.
Discussion and conclusion
This paper examined the conditions under which hybrid arrangements that contractually
combine resources from public authorities and private operators can outperform the polar
cases of public bureaus and full privatization in the delivery of a speciﬁc subset of public
goods that we identiﬁed as “critical services”. This concept builds on the accumulation of
recent reports and empirical studies[3] and on insights from theoretical contributions about
the speciﬁcity of some public goods (Hart et al., 1997; Williamson, 1999; Kunneke et al.,
2010). Following indications from this literature, we argued that the production and delivery
of these services raise questions about their most appropriate modality of organization. We
suggested, and substantiated with stylized examples from two critical services, prisons and
defense, that there might be comparative advantages in relying on hybrid arrangements
rather than the usual solutions of fully private or fully governmental provision. However, we
also submitted that these advantages are conditional to the capacity of hybrids to reconcile
competing interests to achieve socio-economic cohesion, to combine capabilities dispersed
among partners to beneﬁt from positive externalities and to satisfy legitimacy concerns with
respect to the role of government.
Notwithstanding the possible success of hybrids under these conditions, there are also
factors that may hamper their capacity to achieve positive results. First, there might be
misalignment between the transfer of substantial decision rights to a private partner and the
sunken investments required. Typically, non-negligible portions of the investments and the
associated risks remain on the shoulders of public authorities, thus challenging the beneﬁts
of PPPs (Hodge & Greve, 2007). Second, the continuing interaction between private
operators and public authorities in hybrid arrangements exposes decision-makers to
inﬂuence costs, capture, and illicit arrangements. Corruption and deviant behavior can be
overcome only if conditions of transparency and accountability are met, which requires
relatively sophisticated institutional settings and civil servants highly immune against
these distortions (Cabral & Lazzarini, 2015). Third, there is the crucial problem of
acceptability. The proper alignment between social norms and the delivery conditions of
these services is central to enhanced performance. To reach social acceptability (Scott, 2008),
the actions of providers must be perceived as desirable and appropriate within a socially
constructed system of norms and beliefs (Suchman, 1995). Gaps or even conﬂicts between
social norms of users and preferences of critical services providers may challenge the
acceptability of arrangements involving non-governmental agents, especially when the
government does not or cannot monitor these agents properly (Forrer et al., 2010).
Implications for theory
Without neglecting these limiting factors, our framework sheds light on the well-deﬁned
circumstances under which hybrids might outperform alternative arrangements in the
delivery of critical services. Our insights contribute to the ongoing debate in the public
administration/management literature and among practitioners about the role of
organizational solutions that differ from extended outsourcing or full privatization and from
Critical
services
349
the in-house provision of public services by public bureaus (Bel et al., 2014; Van Den Hurk&
Verhoest, 2016; Warsen et al., 2018). Focusing the attention on “critical services” enabled us
to push further in the direction suggested by some scholars about potential gains from
public-private interactions and their implications on value creation (Kivleniece & Quelin,
2012).
Our contribution also fosters the dialogue between public management and strategic
management (Boyne & Walker, 2010; Mahoney et al., 2009). By integrating strategic
management constructs such as capabilities, our paper offers an enhanced understanding
about the role of hybrids in public service performance improvement, thus contributing to
reﬁne strategic management theories and enlarge their scope beyond business-level policies
(Barney, 2005; Ring & Perry, 1985).
Implications for practice
Our analysis also addresses aspects relevant for policymakers who have to choose and
create organizational solutions for delivering critical services. Our propositions allow the
identiﬁcation of necessary conditions under which public-private collaboration in critical
services might work, thus helping public managers and politicians in the decision process.
They also suggest the key role of speciﬁc capabilities among public and private actors to
make hybrids successful solutions in delivering critical services. Governments and private
actors must leverage their ability to effectively procure and manage goods and services
delivered through joint action. In the same vein, ﬁrms and public authorities should promote
internal structures that allow them to code and retain the accumulated learning from
previous and current collaborations, for example by developing adequate information
systems and coopting committedmanagers[4].
Wrapping it up
Besides the development of speciﬁc capabilities to deal with the peculiarities of critical
services and engender a collaborative approach, we pointed out the importance of
appropriate motivations to deal with risk allocation and the gains from adequate control
mechanisms. The absence of accountability structures enabling a more transparent
contracting environment is likely to jeopardize the legitimacy of hybrids in critical services.
Policymakers must be aware of these aspects before stimulating a massive participation of
private actors in critical services, otherwise the observed results can be as a bad as, or even
worse than those obtained via polar modes, and have deterrent effects on future potentially
beneﬁcial projects.
Finally, we emphasized through the examples of prisons and defense that positive results
from choosing hybrids can be expected only if speciﬁc conditions are met. Public
management literature will beneﬁt from future studies that offer a more thorough
comparative analysis using primary sources. Further research efforts can also promote data
collection to allow quantitative tests to substantiate or challenge our analysis. We are aware
that this is not an easy task as the very nature of critical services often makes information a
strategic issue. Nevertheless, we are conﬁdent that future works can collect additional
empirical evidence and test them against our propositions.
Notes
1. International cooperation in the defense industry is illustrative: the European NH-90 helicopter
exists in 23 versions in order to satisfy diﬀerent functions prioritized by participating
governments.
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2. We are aware that critical services can be used to sustain the dominance of local elites at the
expense of oppressing signiﬁcant portions of the wider society (North, Wallis, & Weingast, 2009).
This is particularly true in autocratic regimes with lower accountability standards. In these
institutional settings, the private participation in critical services can generate an opposite eﬀect
compared to what we propose and social cohesion will not hold.
3. Signiﬁcant examples are: Moteﬀ, Copeland, & Fisher (2003), the Directive on European Critical
Infrastructures (Dec. 08, 2008), the US Presidential Policy Directive 21 (Feb. 12, 2013), Financial
Stability Board (2013).
4. As already noted by Palay (1985, p. 168) successful agreements require “high premium on
personnel with long memories, sound hearts, and a penchant for looking both ways before
crossing the street”.
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